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This is the Final Report of the Senate Task Force on Family
Equity.- This report is the culmination of a nine month
investigation undertaken on behalf of the California State Senate.
The report has two purposes:
1. to review research on the economic impact of divorce on
women, men, and children subsequent to the enactment of
California's "no-fault" divorce law in 1970, and
2. to recommend legislative remedies for some of the problems
created by the present laws and their administration.
Joanne Schulman, J.D., is a practicing family law attorney. Ms. Schulman served as staff
attorney for the Senate Task Force and authored this Report. She thanks Anne Thorkelson,
J.D., for her assistance and support.
Sara L. McCarthy, M.A, is a Senior Consultant with the California State Senate Office
of Research, specializing in child support, social services, and housing. Ms. McCarthy edited
this report.
Mimi Modisette, B.A., is a Senior Consultant to State Senator Gary Hart, specializing
in family law, consumer affairs, and human services issues. Ms. Modisette edited this report.
This report reflects the recommendations of the majority of the Task Force members.
The Task Force wishes to express thanks to the Senate Office of Research, and also staff
support provided by Donne Brownsey and Patricia Wynne.
** FEds. Note: The Senate Task Force Report on Family Equity will be reprinted in the
Hastings Women's Law Journal in two parts. The Preface, Introduction, and Chapters 3
(Family Home) and 4 (Spousal Support) are reprinted in this Volume. The next issue, Vol.
1:2, will contain Chapters 1 (Judiciary), 2 (Community Property), 5 (Child Support), and 6
(Custody and Mediation). This Report was first published as a California State Senate
Publication in June 1987. Where legislative action has been taken on the Legislative
Proposals within this Report, the Proposal is so noted.]
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HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J.
In March 1986, Senator David Roberti, Senate President pro
Tempore (D-Hollywood/Burbank), "and Senator Gary Hart
(D-Ventura) co-sponsored Senate Resolution 28 establishing the
Task Force on Family Equity. As set forth in SR 28, the Task
Force was created in response to the national impact of California's
"no-fault" divorce reforms and increasing concern over their adverse
economic effects on women and children. The economic hardships
caused by the current legal system of divorce were revealed by the
publication in 1985 of The Divorce Revolution: The Unexpected Social
and Economic Consequences for Women and Children in America,
authored by Harvard Professor Dr. Lenore Weitzman. This book
was the result of a ten year study of the effect of California's
divorce law reforms (which was prepared while Lenore Weitzman
was a Professor at Stanford University in California). Other
research has also documented the economic consequences of this
legal reform.
Senate Resolution 28 reads, in part:
... WHEREAS, In 1970, California adopted the first law in the
United States abolishing the requirement of the establishment of
fault as a basis for the dissolution of marriage; and
WHEREAS, Since 1970, 48 other states have also adopted
some form of a "no-fault" approach to marital dissolution; and
WHEREAS, The "no-fault" legal reform was intended to
eliminate the acrimony and stigma of divorce and to secure the
equal treatment of men and women in divorce settlements; and
WHEREAS, Recent research indicates that an unintended
impact of "no-fault" divorce has been severe economic loss to
divorced women and their children, including a significant
reduction in the percentage of women receiving permanent
support and in the percentage of women retaining the family
home; and
WHEREAS,.Accompanying the change to a "no-fault" basis for
dissolution of marriage have been major revisions in child custody
and support laws; ...
The Senate Task -Force on Family Equity is hereby created
to study, analyze, and develop proposals for legislation and to
comment on legislation relating to the revision of family law. The
Task Force shall review recommendations based on the book, The
Divorce Revolution: The Unexpected Social and Economic
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Consequences for Women and Children in America, and shall
develop specific proposals for those revisions of state law it deems
necessary after review of the recommendations.
The Task Force's mandate was large in scope. As a guide in
carrying out this mandate and developing specific legislative
proposals, the Task Force adopted the following Mission Statement
at its first meeting on April 7, 1986 (one Task Force member,
Marvin Chapman, had not yet been appointed).
MISSION STATEMENT'
To address the need to equalize the results of divorce,
focusing especially on assuring adequate economic protections for
the older homemaker and minor children.
Specifically, the Task Force will provide to the Senate
recommendations relating to the appropriate definition and
division of marital property, the improvement of the enforcement
of child and spousal support orders, and provisions for child
custody.
Additionally, the Task Force will examine currently pending
legislation relating to marital property, spousal support, and child
support and make recommendations to the Legislature.
As directed by Senate Resolution 28, the Task Force examined
the findings of Professor Weitzman's book, The Divorce Revolution,
and the growing body of academic and governmental research
documenting the economic hardships created by the current legal
system of divorce. The Task Force held a public hearing in Los
Angeles on October 16, 1986, and received oral and written
testimony from across the state. Seventeen persons testified at the
hearing, and an additional fifty-nine submitted written testimony. (A
transcript of the hearing is available from the Senate Judiciary
Committee.) In addition, the Task Force divided into
subcommittees to accommodate the workload. The subcommittees
reviewed reports, studies, legislation, and recommendations from
recognized family law experts in California and around the country.
As a result of its investigations, the Task Force concluded that
the findings and trends presented in The Divorce Revolution are
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indeed serious problems which need to be addressed. The Task
Force is therefore recommending twenty-three specific legislative
proposals, which address inequities created by the current legal
system of divorce. These proposals address inequities in the way
property is defined and divided, and the standards for awarding and
enforcing child support and spousal support. They also address
specific problems in custody and mediation. The Task Force
developed the twenty-three specific legislative recommendations by
balancing considerations of urgency, political feasibility, and
emergihg trends in other states.
Following its mandate, the Task Force did not address two
specific issues: (1) whether to return to a fault-based divorce
system, and (2) whether to abandon mandatory "equal division" in
favor of "equitable division." Task Force members believed that
these two issues were beyond the scope of their mandate, which was
to develop' specific proposals to remedy the inequities of the present
legal system of no-fault divorce with a mandatory equal division of
community property. However, the Task Force received substantial
oral and written testimony from men and women urging a major
overhaul of the current statutes which would include the
reinstitution of fault and changing the equal division requirement
of the current law. Thus, the Legislature may want to consider
these alternatives in the future if legislation aimed at correcting the
inequities of the current system does not prove effective.
The Task Force does not intend that its proposals serve as the
final or sole solutions to the problems identified. The Task Force
recommendations are intended to serve as a starting point for
enhancing equality and equity in the economic outcomes of divorce.
Members of the Senate Task Force on Family Equity are:
SENATOR DAVID ROBERTI (D-Hollywood/Burbank), President pro
Tempore of the Senate; Chair, Senate Rules Committee; Chair,
Senate Select Committee on Small Business Enterprises; J.D.,
University of Southern California School of Law, 1964. Senator
Roberti coauthored Senate Resolution 28 establishing the Task
Force on Family Equity. Senator Roberti has sponsored legislation
to evaluate pay inequities in state Civil Service and he authored the
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landmark "Latchkey" child care bill, SB 303 (Ch.1026/85).
SENATOR GARY HART (D-Ventura, Los Angeles, Santa Barbara),
Chair, Senate Education Committee. Senator Hart coauthored
Senate Resolution 28 establishing the Task Force on Family Equity.
He also authored Senate Bill 1751 (Ch.1408/86) which established
mandatory wage assignments for all child support awards beginning
January 1, 1987.
SENATOR BILL LOCKYER (D-Alameda), Chair, Senate Judiciary
Committee. In 1986, Senator Lockyer authored Senate Bill 1071
(Ch.1091/86) which established a spouse's right to financial
disclosure and an accounting of community property information
prior to separation or divorce.
SENATOR REBECCA MORGAN (R-San Mateo, Santa Clara), Chair,
Senate Select Committee on Infant and Child Care Development;
Vice Chair, Senate Education Committee. Senator Morgan
sponsored in 1986 Senate Bill 2065 which would have continued
child support through post-high school education. Senator Morgan
reintroduced that bill in 1987 as Senate Bill 13.
MICHAEL E. BARBER, Supervising Deputy District Attorney,
Sacramento District Attorney's Office (in charge of support
enforcement and paternity determination cases); Member, California
Governor's Commission on Child Support Development and
Enforcement (1984-1985); Member, Council of the American Bar
Association Family Law Section; Member, Executive Committee of
the California State Bar Family Law Section; Member, Executive
Committee of the California District Attorney's Family Support
Council; Consultant, National District Attorney's Association Project
on Child Support Enforcement.
MARVIN CHAPMAN, M.S., Counseling Psychology; Vice President,
United Fathers of America, Inc. (an organization which provides
education and suppori services to divorced and separated fathers
and mothers); Marriage, Family and Child Counselor Intern;
Mediator, California Divorce Mediation Center (Santa Ana), and
the Los Angeles Superior Court: Member, Academy of Family
Mediators, Association of Family and Conciliation Courts, California
Association of Marriage and Family Therapists, and the National
Council for Children's Rights; Author, Divorced Fathers: Attitudinal
and Demographic Characteristics, Conciliation Court Review.
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RITA GORDON, Member, State Social Services Advisory Board;
Recipient, International Netherlands Exchange Program Award for
Human Services (1986); Chief Consultant, Senate Select Committee
on Children and Youth (1980-84).
JUDGE WILLIAM HOGOBOOM, Vice President and General
Counsel, University. of Southern California; Adjunct Professor of
Law, University of Southern California Law School; Author,
California Practice Guide, Family Law; Former Presiding Judge, Los
Angeles Superior Court, Juvenile Court and Family Law Court.
HANNAH BETH JACKSON, Partner, Eskin and Jackson (Ventura
and Santa Barbara); Former Chair, California Commission on the
Status of Women; Member, Santa Barbara County Commission on
Women; Member, California Governor's Commission on Child
Support Development and Enforcement (1984-1985).
FRANCES LEONARD, Legal Counsel, Older Women's League
(Washington, D.C.); publications include: Dissolution: The
Disillusionment of Divorce for Older Women (1980); The
Three-Legged Stool Women and Retirement (in) Security, Hastings
Law Journal (1981); Older Women and Pensions: Catch 22, Golden
Gate University Law Review (1980).
JUDGE JuDrm MCCONNELL, Presiding Judge, San Diego Juvenile
Court; Chair, Senate Task Force on Family Equity; Chair, Juvenile
Court Institute (1987); Chair, Juvenile Court Committee of the
Superior Court; Founding Member, Former Director, and
President-Elect, National Association of Women Judges.
PAMELA E. PIERSON, an owner of the law firm of Schapiro,
Thorn, Pierson, Inc. (San Francisco); California Certified Family
Law Specialist; Member, Family Law Section, California State Bar;
Chair, Executive Committee, California State Bar Family Law
Section, Secretary, Northern California Chapter of the American
Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers.
JOHN L. REPLOGLE III, Assistant District Attorney, Family
Support Division, Riverside County Office; Member, Executive
Committee of the California State Bar Family Law Section and the
California District Attorney's Association Steering Committee on
Nationwide Automated Child Support Systems; President, California
Family Support Council.
MILO SMITH, Consultant on older women's employment and
[Vol. 1.9
1989] SENATE TASK FORCE REPORT ON FAMILY EQUITY 15
training issues, currently providing technical assistance to the State
Department of Vocational Education's SOLO Resource Project;
Founding Director, Displaced Homemakers Center in the United
States (1976-86).
JUDITH WALLERSTEIN, PH.D., Executive Director, Center for the
Family in Transition (Marin County); Co-Author, Surviving the
Breakup: How Children and Parents Cope With Divorce (1980);
Senior Lecturer, School of Social Welfare, University of California
at Berkeley; Senior Lecturer, Boalt Hall, University of California at
Berkeley; Fellow, Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral
Sciences, Stanford University. Dr. Wallerstein has reported her
research in over forty articles in legal and social science periodicals
and books, including The Family Law Quarterly; American Journal of
Orthopsychiatry; Journal of the American Academy of Child
Psychiatry; Family Advocate; The Judge's Journal; the American
Journal of Psychiatry; the Columbia Journal of Law and Social
Problems, Behavioral Sciences and the Law, and Mediation Quarterly.
LENORE J. WEITZMAN, PH.D., Columbia University; Associate
Professor, Sociology, Harvard University; Postdoctoral Fellowship,
Yale Law School; Author, The Divorce Revolution: The Unexpected
Social and Economic Consequences for Women and Children in
America (received the 1986 Book Award for Distinguished
Contribution to Scholarship, American Sociological Association);
Director, Research Project on the Impact of California's Divorce
Law Reforms (under grants from the National Science Foundation
and the National Institute of Mental Health); Fellow, Oxford
University (1980-81); Member, Institute for Advanced Study,
Princeton University (1984); Guggenheim Fellow (1985); Past Chair,
Family Section, American Sociological Association; Member,
Executive Council, International Society on Family Law.
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Introduction
One of the most compelling problems facing this nation is the
diminished standard of living, and sometimes impoverishment, in
which women and children find themselves as a result of divorce.
Children living in single-parent, female-headed families are almost
five times as likely to be living below the poverty level as children
in two-parent families. In 1984, 45.7 percent of the poverty
population was made up of mothers living alone with children, as
compared to 18 percent of fathers living alone with children, and
9.4 percent of two-parent families.' The National Advisory Council
on Economic Opportunity estimates that if this current trend
continues, the poverty population of the United States will be
composed solely of women and children by the year 2000.2
The "feminization of poverty' is of particular significance in
California, which has the highest number of single-parent families of
any state in the country.3 The number of female-headed households
in California with children under age eighteen has increased from
565,000. in 1977, to 648,000 in 1986. Female-headed households
with children under age six have significantly increased from 168,000
in 1977 to 275,000 in 1986.
4
Importantly, a high and increasing percentage of California's
female-headed households with children live in-poverty. In 1977, 42
percent of these families were living on incomes below the federal
poverty guideline. This percentage increased to 46 percent in 1986.
Female-headed households with children under age six are in even
worse condition. In 1977, 44 percent of these households lived
below the federal poverty level; by 1986, this increased to 54
1 U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, Current Characterfi of the Population Below the
Poverty Line CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS (Series P-6, March 1985).
2 Pearce & McAdoo, Women and Children: Alone in Poverty (National Advisory Council
on. Economic Opportunity, Sept. 1981); reprinted in 15 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 925 (1982).
3 DixoN, CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT. UNEQUAL PROTECION UNDER THE LAW 9
(1985).
4 CAUFORNmA STATE CENSUS DATA CENTER, CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY, as reported
i, DuBay & Halley, Family Income in California 6-7 (California Senate Office of Research
1987).
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percent.5
Divorce is one of the major causes of the rise in single-parent
female-headed families. While unwed motherhood is swiftly rising,
divorced or separated families make up the majority of single-parent
households. -Over 50 percent of female-headed households are
headed by divorced mothers and 31 percent by separated mothers,
as compared to only 18 percent by unwed mothers.6
The older woman whose children are grown also often faces
severe economic loss as the result of divorce, particularly if she, like
many women in previous decades, made homemaking and
childrearing her career.7 A 1983 Urban Institute report pointed out
that:
Despite changing social mores over the past decade many women
who are middle aged today were raised to believe in the
traditional role for a woman, i.e., caring for a home and a family
in exchange for economic support. Many married young and have
fewer years of formal education and training than their male or
younger female counterparts. Few expected, or were trained, to
support themselves. 8
Employment prospects for the older woman who has been out
of the labor force for a considerable period of time frequently are
not promising. A State Department of Education report showed
that displaced homemakers have higher than average unemployment
rates and, when employed, often have to settle for lower wages and
for less than full time or full year work.9 They also face a
psychological trauma as a result of divorce: a woman who has been
a homemaker for many years faces the simultaneous loss of her
5 Id.
6 L. WErITMAN, THE DIVORCm REvoLunoN: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC
CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA 35 (1985).
7 Id. at 187-94.
8 E. VANsIC, D. SMITH NIGHTINGALE & C. TAYLOR O'BRIEN, EMPLOYMENT
DEVELOPMENT NEEDS OF DISPLACED HOMEMAKERS: FINAL REPORT 4 (1983).
9 CALIFORNIA STATE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, A STATISTICAL REPORT ON THE
STATUS OF DISPLACED HOMEMAKERS IN CALIFORNIA 15 (1982). See also, OFFICE OF
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, TECHNOLOGY AND
STRUCTURAL UNEMPLOYMENT: REEMPLOYING DISPLACED ADULTS 409 (1986).
HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J.
spouse, career (homemaking), social status, role (wife), and, often,
her home and neighborhood. 10
Economic Disparity of Post-Divorce'Households
The rising divorce rate and enactment of the divorce reforms of
the last two decades, beginning with California's enactment of "no
fault" divorce in 1970, have directly contributed to the poverty of
women and children." The major finding of Harvard Professor
Lenore Weitzman's ten year study of California divorce laws,
presented in The Divorce Revolution, reveals the adverse economic
consequences and economic disparity between post-divorce
households: divorced women and their children suffer an immediate
drop in their standard of living in the first year after divorce, while
their ex-husbands enjoy an increase in their standard of living.2
Findings from other studies based on local, state, and national
samples have also documented this severe economic disparity
between post-divorce households.? A study involving randomly
selected households across the nation documents that
"female-headed households are likely to be low-income households
. . . primarily because marital separation produces a precipitous
decline in women's household incomes.. " 14
Despite the influx of women into the paid labor market,
husbands are still the major household wage-earners. One
researcher who studied income data (1968-1979) from a sample of
over 3,000 U.S. households found that in two-parent married
households, the husband's earnings provided on average,
10 CAUIFORNIA STATE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, THE NEEDS OF DISPLACED
HOMEMAKERS IN CALIFORNIA 11 (1986).
* 11 L. WErrZMAN, supra note 6, at 350-66.
12 Id at 323, 339.
13 See, e.g., Weiss, The Impact of Marital Dissolution on Income and Consumption in
Single-parent Households, 46 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 115-27 (1984); Wishik, Economics of
Divorce: An Exploratory Study, 20 FAM. L.Q. 79 (1986); OFFICE OF COURT ADMIN., REPORT
OF THE NEW YORK TASK FORCE ON WOMEN IN THE COURTS 93-122, 128-58 (1986); L.
WErrZMAN, supra note 6, at 337; Espenshade, The Economic Consequences of Divorce, 41
J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 615, 615-25 (1979); Brandwein, Brown & Fox, Women and Children
Last, 36 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 498, 498-514 (1974).
14 Weiss, supra note 13, at 115.
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about 80 percent of household income. In those married
households in which wives had earnings, their earnings contributed
about one-fourth of the total income in the lower income group,
about one-fifth in the higher income group, and somewhere
between these two in the middle income group. 5
Although the percentage of family income contributed by wives
may have increased since 1979, wives on average still earn
considerably less than husbands. According to one report based on
1986 Census data, among wives who worked outside the home
between 1981 and 1983 ".... average earnings increased 7.9 percent
• . . but still were only . . . 44 percent of what their husbands
brought home."'16  When it is considered that approximately 38
percent of wives do not work outside the home, and among those
who d6, earnings are only 44 percent of their husband's earnings, it
can be seen that the husband's earnings still contribute the great
majority of family income. (The majority of married women reduce
or eliminate their work hours in the paid labor force for a period of
time for childrearing. See Appendix for a chart prepared by
researchers at the Rand Corporation, Linda Waite, et. al., showing
dramatically lower labor force participation rates even two years
after child birth.)
The Task Force heard testimony at the public hearing about a
recent U.S. Census report which indicated that in 20 percent of
those families in which both parents work outside the home, the
wife makes more than the husband. According to that report, these
tend to be women who are working year-round, full-time, Who have
no minor children at home, who are college educated and who work
in professional or managerial occupations. Clearly, these women are
not representative of the typical married woman in the labor force.
While 62 percent of mothers work outside the home at some time
during the year, the majority do not work full time, full year.17 In fact,
of married mothers, only 29 percent work outside the home all year
15 I6 at 119.
16 One-fifth of Working Wives Earn More Than Husbands, Study Shows, Orange County
Reg., May 7, 1986, at A-16.
17 Besharov & Daily, One Policy for Working Moms Won't Fit All, Wall St. J., October
29, 1986, at 28.
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round. The percentage is even lower for those with children less
than six years old--only 23 percent of this group work outside the
home full-time, year-round. While these data show that wives and
mothers generally earn less than husbands, and that this is especially
true in families with young children, the Task Force recognized the
variation among families and framed its proposals in gender neutral
terms to recognize economic, rather than sex-based, disparities.
One of the primary factors responsible for the disparity in
post-divorce household income is that too often one spouse, usually
the husband, on whose income the other spouse and children have
been dependent, leaves the marriage with almost the entirety of his
or her earning capacity. Thus, he retains a relatively large share of
the family's total income for himself, even when he pays child or
spousal support. Also, as the husband is typically not the custodial
parent, he retains a greater excess of income over needs, as
compared to the wife and children. Further, his future increased
earnings due to promotions, merit raises, and cost-of-living increases
are retained for his exclusive use which, in the married family, would
have been shared by the entire family unit.
18
Professor Weitzman examined the post-divorce income of
California husbands and wives one year after their divorce. She
found that in all cases, regardless of length of marriage or marital
income, divorced women were left with far less income than their
former husbands. For example, one year after divorce women from
marriages of less than ten years with total pre-divorce family
incomes of $20,000 to $30,000 had only 56 percent of the total
pre-divorce family income, whereas their ex-husbands had 78 percent
of that income -- a discrepancy of 22 percent between the parties'
post-divorce incomes. 19
The disparity between former husbands and wives becomes more
extreme when measured on a per capita basis, i.e., when adjusted
for the number of people supported by each party's income. In
other words, the fact that women are more likely than men to have
dependent children in their households means that their post-divorce
income must be shared. Their standard of living is therefore less
18 L. WErrzmm, supra note 6, at 342-43.
19 Id at 326-29.
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than the ex-husband's whose income is not shared. Thus, the
discrepancy between the parties income dramatically increases from
22 percent when based solely on family income, to 83 percent when
based on per capita family income.2°
In addition to research by Professor Weitzman, other studies
show that this disparity becomes greater as the pre-divorce family
income increases, i.e., the downward mobility of divorced women is
greatest in middle and upper middle class families. For example,
Professor Robert Weiss of the University of Massachusetts analyzed
a national sample of men and women and found that "separation
and divorce brought about reduction of income in every income
category, the reduction being greatest where the marital income had
been the greatest."21 Similarly, among California divorced men and
women, Professor Lenore Weitzman found that the disparity
between former spouses increased as pre-divorce family income
increased. For example, "among families with pre-divorce incomes
of $40,000 a year or more, the wives and children are left with half
of their former per capita income level, while the husband's per
capita income is close to 200 percent above his former level."22 She
concludes that "it is tl~e discrepancy between the two households, a
discrepancy that is largest among middle-class and upper middle-class
couples, that engenders the resentment that so many divorced
women express."''
The economic hardship imposed on women as a result of divorce is
permanent and does not abate or equalize in time. As Professor Weiss
observed:
In all income groups the reduction in income consequent to marital
disruption appears to persist indefinitely as long as the households
remain headed by female single parents. Although single-parent
households were followed for only five years, nowhere was there any
evidence of a return to anything approaching the married household
income... Here is a critical difference between the married poor
... and the single parent poor: the former, taken as a group, do
20 Id. at 327-29.
21 Weiss, supra note 13, at 116-17 (emphasis added).
22 L WErrZMAN, supra note 6, at 329.
23 Id. at 329.
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better with time; the latter do not. On' average, the married poor
move out of poverty; the single-parent poor remain there.24
As one child of divorce wrote the Task Force:
My mother and father divorced in 1975 . . . Within 3 years, my
father had bought a new house. My mother entered the work
force at McDonald's working for minimum wage. She later found
work cleaning house--a profession she'd perfected as a housewife.
• .. At 56 years old, my mother wants to enjoy the fruits of her
labor. My father has a retirement income to look forward to. His
job pays benefits, sick leave, and vacation. My mother doesn't
earn any benefits.... The current laws don't honor the work of
wives and mothers as much as they reward those who work
outside the home. Today's society doesn't value women's work as
much as men's.-s
The emotional consequences of divorce are exacerbated by the
economic disparity in the two post-divorce households. Women
remain bitter when their living standards remain seriously inferior
to those of their former husbands. Children, who share their
custodial mother's lower standard of living, are angry when they
compare their lower standard of living with the higher standard of
their noncustodial parent.2 Just as the economic impact is
permanent, the emotional consequences of divorce are also
long-lasting.
Effect of Reforms
The divorce reform laws and their interpretation by the courts
have failed to equalize the economic consequences of divorce
between men and women. Changes in community property law (for
example," moving to mandatory equal division as opposed to the
24 Weiss, supra note 13, at 126 (emphasis added).
25 Public Hearing Record, Hearings Before the Senate Task Force on Family Equiy (Oct.
16, 1986) (written testimony of K. Dumont).
26 J. WALLERSTEIN & KELLY, SURVIVING THE BREAK-UP: How CHILDREN AND PARENTS
COPE wrTH DIVORCE 231 (1980).
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discretion judges had in dividing property before 1970), in spousal
and child support laws, and in judicial practices, have all had
economic effects.
Equal division of community property has not resulted in equality
of results: it is not "equal" to award one spouse, usually the
husband, one-half of the assets, while the other half of the assets
have to be shared by the wife and two children.27 Nor is it an equal
division of property when one spouse retains the entire, most
valuable community asset--their career and enhanced earning
capacity.28 Professor Weitzman's research revealed that "the average
divorcing couple earns more in one year than the total value of
their tangible property existing at the time of divorce. 29 One of the
most devastating consequences of the equal division of property rule
has been the increased forced sale of the family home at divorce,
thereby creating severe and unnecessary hardship for minor children
and homemaker spouses in marriages of long. duration3
Courts also have failed to use spousal and child support awards
to help equalize the economic consequences of divorce. Nationally,
only 14 percent of divorcing women are even awarded spousal
support3' (17 percent in California). The average alimony award
.nationally in 1983 was $3,980, averaging only 22 percent of the
average male's income.3' (See Chapter IV).
Furthermore, child support awards do not meet even half the
actual dollar costs of raising children. The average annual child
support payment in 1983 was $2,340, constituting only 13 percent of
the average male's income.3 And less than 50 percent of custodial
mothers received full payment3 (See Chapter V)35.
27 L. W~rIZMAN, supra note 6, at 358.
28 Id. at xiii.
29 Id
30 Id. at 77-93.31; U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, Child Support and Alimony: 1983,
CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS 3-4 (Series P-23).
31 U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 30, at 4.
32 Id,
33 Id. at 2.
34 Id. at 1.
35 [Eds. Note: Chapter V (Child Support) will be printed in Vol. 1:2 of the Hastings
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The disadvantages women suffer after divorce are also a result
of societal and judicial misconceptions regarding women's
employment opportunities and earnings and men's participation in
homemaking and childrearing activities.3 The divorce reform laws,
and judicial application of these laws, has been based on the myth
that women have obtained equality in the paid labor market, and
that the majority of married women are working full time in the
paid work market. Concommitantly, judges presume that men are
now sharing equally in the work in the home, including
childrearing. 37 In fact, this is not the reality for many couples. As
mentioned above, the majority of married mothers who live with
their husbands and have small children do not work full time all
year round. Close to 60 percent of married women with children
interrupt their careers or "work lives" in the paid labor market to
assume child rearing and homemaking responsibilities.8 As noted by
researchers Douglas Besharov and Michelle Dally,
[W]omen who stay home at least part time to care for their
children do so at no small personal cost; the time and effort they
devote to raising families reduces their job experience, seniority
and thus, their earning potential. The tax code, welfare policy
and the laws on child support enforcement should all better
recognize their contribution and the career costs that result .... 39
The failure of the courts and the law to recognize and
compensate for the "inequalities" or differences between men and
women that are created during the marriage can result in women
and children suffering a disproportionate share of the economic loss
often associated with divorce.
Women's Law Journal.]
36 See Larson, Equity and Economics: A Case for Spousal Support, 8 GoLDEN GATE U.L.
REV. 443-44 (1979); Krauskopf, Maintenance: A Decade of Development, 50 Mo. L REV.
259-63 (1985).
37 See Polikoff, Gender and Child Custody Determinations: Exploding the Mths, in
FAMIUES, PoLMcs AND PUBUC POuCY 188-89, 195 (I. Diamond ed. 1983).
38 Besharov & Dally, supra note 17.
39 Id.
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The Research
National, state, and local studies as well as federal census data
document the economic disparity between the post-divorce
households of men and women. 0 On a national level the most
comprehensive data comes from the U.S. Census Bureau. In
addition, Professor Robert Weiss of the University of Massachusetts
used a nationally representative sample of 5,000 households and
followed the experiences of divorced men and women in 173
households for five years after their divorce.41 His findings point to
the disparities between former husbands and wives and the
economic hardships that women and children face after divorce.
In California the most comprehensive research was conducted by
Professor Lenore J. Weitzman when she was at Stanford University.
As reported in The Divorce Revolution, her research is based on the
collection and analysis of five types of data including random
samples of 2,500 divorce court records between 1968 and 1977,
which were supplemented and verified by questionnaires and lengthy
interviews with 228 divorced men and women, 169 family law
attorneys and 44 family law judges (which continued through 1985).42
Professor Weitzman's study was supported by grants and fellowships
from the National Institute of Mental Health, the National Science
Foundation, the Ford Foundation and a Guggenheim fellowship. In
recognition of the quality and importance of Weitzman's research,
The Divorce Revolution was awarded the 1986 Book of the Year
Award by the American Sociological Association.
The Fault with No-Fault
The "divorce revolution" began in 1970 with California's
enactment of the first no-fault divorce law in the country. By
eliminating the need to prove grounds for divorce, a divorce could
easily be obtained upon the unilateral request of one spouse and
without the consent of the other. The purpose of no-fault was to
40 See supra note 13.
41 Wiess, supra note 13, at 115-16.
42 L. WEnTmAN, supra note 6, at xviii-xii.
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reduce the acrimony and hostility between spouses and to provide
a less adversarial process for terminating marriage.
With the no-fault law came California's mandatory equal
(fifty/fifty) division of property rule (now in Civil Code Section
4800). The mandatory equal division of property was intended to
treat men and women equally with respect to financial settlements
at divorce.
California continued this family law "revolution" in 1980 and
1981 by enacting one of the first joint custody laws in the country,
and by requiring mediation of all custody and visitation disputes.
These revisions in the custody area had the same basic purpose as
the earlier no-fault and "equal division" reforms. Mediation was
intended to reduce hostility between parents and provide a
nonadversarial process for settling custody disputes. Joint custody
was intended to treat men and women equally with respect to their
childrearing rights and responsibilities.
The unintended hardships created by the divorce reforms were
the result of flaws in the reasoning of the reformers. First, the
reforms were based on assumptions, rather than knowledge or data
on the economic consequences of divorce. For example, the
reformers assumed that under fault, property was already being
divided equally, or close to equally.43
Had Professor Weitzman's 1968 data, showing that women were
awarded the majority of the community property under fault, been
compiled at the time of the reforms, it would have been evident
that women were going to be economically disadvantaged by a
mandatory 50/50 division. Her study found that women receive less
community property under "no-fault" than under the prior "fault"
system. In 1968, under fault, courts were not required to equally
divide community property. Women received 61 percent of the
community property under fault, in three-quarters (75 percent) of
divorces. (Women were awarded 86 percent of the community
property in San Francisco County and 58 percent of the community
property in Los Angeles County in 1968). Thus the reforms of
1970, which required an "equal division" of property, wherein women
receive 50 percent of the community property, actually decreased
43 Id at 75.
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the amount of property women now received in divorce. 44
Secondly, the reforms were based on a theory of equality that
ignored the economic realities of men's and women's lives in the
home and in the paid labor market. In effect, these reforms treated
men and women at divorce not as "equals," but as "identicals." .The
reforms assumed that men and women were performing identical
tasks in the home and in the paid labor market, and could therefore
recover from divorce in an identical fashion. They ignored the
different roles assumed by men and women within marriage and how
those roles influenced each spouse's participation in the paid labor
market.
As noted above, despite the increased participation of women in
the work force during marriage, women continue to be primarily
responsible for homemaking and childrearing functions.4 Therefore,
in many marriages, women have made sacrifices in their careers in
the paid labor market in order to shoulder their homemaking and
child rearing responsibilities. These sacrifices have contributed
toward the enhancement of their husband's career and earning
capacity. At the time of divorce women and men are, therefore,
not similarly or identically situated economically. Yet, the law often
assumes erroneously that they are:
Most people don't realize that liberalized divorce laws all but
require divorced mothers to work--or go on welfare. In almost all
states, alimony is a thing of the past. The law now assumes that
a divorced mother can--and should--support herself regardless of
the family's pre-divorce work arrangements and regardless of her
earning capacity.46
Another flaw in the reformers' "equality" theory was the failure
44 Id at 73-76.
45 Polikoff, supra note 37, at 195. See also Cruver, Husbands and Housework It's Still
An Uneven Load, USA Today, August 20, 1986, at 5 (study shows that employed wives
spend 26 hours a week on housework, while their husbands spend 36 minutes); BUREAU OF
LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. oF' LABOR, EMPLOYMENT IN PERSPECrIVE: WOMEN IN THE
LABOR FORCE, REPORT 730 (1986) (study indicating that 82% of women do all or most of
the housework, despite the fact that over half of women are in the paid labor force);
Krauskopf, supra note 36, at 260-61.
46 Besharov & Daily, supra note 17.
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to view equality within the context of the entire family unit. While
the reforms intended to treat divorcing men and women equally,
they did not treat all members of the family unit equally. While all
family members share property and assets during the marriage, at
divorce one member of the family, usually the husband, often leaves
the marriage with one-half of the assets, while the remaining
members of the family unit (typically a wife and two children) are
left with the other half to divide among three people.47
Thus, in practice, the family law reforms and their interpretation
by judges did not promote equality after divorce because they did
not equalize the benefits or assets of the marriage among the family
members so that all would share equally. Instead, the reforms have
resulted in unequal treatment of spouses, recognizing only the
monetary contributions of one spouse, ignoring the nonmonetary
contributions and sacrifices of the other, and ignoring the needs and
rights of the children to share equally in the family's assets.
After nearly two decades under California's divorce reforms,
data now exists revealing the need to correct the unintended
consequences of these laws. The fault with no-fault--and its
inequitable economic consequences--is not going to be alleviated
without serious attention by the California courts and the
Legislature. Indeed, California has a special responsibility to quickly
address the economic hardships created by the divorce reforms given
its leadership role in the nation in first enacting these reforms.
Task Force Proposals
This Report sets forth the Task Force's findings and
recommendations on the need for legislation, research, and
administrative initiatives. The Report is divided into the following
chapters, each of which sets forth the Task Force findings and
specific recommendations8:
Chapter One addresses problems with and facing the Judiciary in its
47 L. WEITZMAN, supra note 6, at 358.
48 [Eds. Note: Chapters 1, 2, 5, and 6 will be printed in Vol. 1:2 of the Hastings
Women's Law Journal. This volume contains the Introduction and Chapters 3 and 4.]
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handling of family law matters.
Chapter Two addresses the difficulties with the current mandatory
"equal division" of community property.
Chapter Three addresses the special problems of disposition of the
family home under California's "equal division" rule.
Chapter Four addresses the use of spousal support as a means of
equalizing the economic burdens of divorce between post divorce
households and of realistically assisting spouses in becoming
self-sufficient.
Chapter Five addresses some of the continuing needs and problems
in the child support area.
Finally, Chapter Six addresses some of the special issues in the area
of child custody and mediation.
A complete set of the actual text of the Legislative proposals can be






Perhaps the most devastating consequence of the no-fault and
"equal division" reforms has been the increase in the forced sale of
the family home upon divorce. Where the family home is the major
or only asset at the time of divorce, sale of the home becomes
necessary to accomplish an equal division of property pursuant to
Civil Coder Section 4800. As noted by Attorney Max Goodman,
Professor of Law at Southwestern'University School of Law and
member of the Los Angeles County Bar Association's Family Law
Section:
Disposition of the family residence has beena source of acute
problems. Frequently the family home is the main, if not only,
asset of substantial value. The desirable disposition is to award
it intact to the dependent spouse, especially if there are minor
children. However, in most cases there are no other assets that
can be awarded to the other spouse to equalize the division.
Requiring the dependent spouse to "cash out" the other is usually
not feasible, due to a lack of funds. Requiring the house to be
sold, and the proceeds divided, means the dependent spouse now
is without a place to live. Using the dependent spouse's half of
the proceeds to buy another house means a mortgage with a
higher interest rate, higher real estate taxes under Proposition 13,
and higher monthly payments on the new encumbrance. Renting
means higher monthly payments (in many cases) than the existing
mortgage required, plus paying a capital gains tax on the gain on
the sale .... 1
Under the prior fault system, the court was not required to
divide the community property equally. Women were typically
awarded the family home, or a majority of its equity, as they were
1 Goodman, Duke Issues, THE FAMILY RESIDENCE ON DISSOLUrION OF MARRIAGE:
SELECMD ISSUES 50, § 7.2 (Oct/Nov 1986).
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usually either the custodial parent and needed the home for the
children, or they were the "innocent party" and, therefore, entitled
to a larger share of the community assets.2 Thus, under the fault
system, women and children retained the family home which, in
many cases, constituted more than half of the community property.
3
It is interesting to note that California's "equal division" rule has
been criticized in other states because it has resulted in the forced
sale of the family home.' Although almost every state has adopted
some form of no-fault divorce, only eight states have.adopted "equal
division" of property.5
The research conducted by Professor Weitzman indicated
increased sales of the family home occurred under no-fault. In
1968, under fault, the family home was divided equally in less than
a quarter (23 percent) of the cases; the majority of the equity in the
home was awarded to the wife in 61 percent of the cases.6 In 1977,
under no-fault, equal division of the home rose to 35 percent, while
the award of the majority of equity to the wife dropped to 46
percent. Furthermore, the "number of cases in which there was an
explicit order to sell the home rose from one in ten in 1968 (under
fault) to about one in three in 1977 (under no-fault).1
7
A San Diego study revealed the same trend. In 1968, under
fault, wives i San Diego were awarded the family home in 60
percent of the cases; by 1977, under no-fault, that percentage had
dropped to 42 percent.8
Professor Weitzman's research found that the family home is the
most important community asset for many divorcing families: almost
half (46 percent) of the divorcing families owned or were purchasing
2 L. WErrzmAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECMD SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC
CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA, 78-79 (1985).
3 Id at 73-76.
4 Perles, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee Concerning Revisions of the Equitable
Distribution Statute 17 FAM. L REv. 21-22 (1985).
5 L. WrMAN, supra note 2, at 47.
6 Id. at 78-79.
7 Id. at 78.
8 Seal, A Decade of No-Fault Divorce 1 FAM. ADvoc. 12 (1977), discussed in L.
WEnrZMAN, supra note 2, at 79.
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a home at the time of divorce.9 Only 11 percent of divorcing
couples owned businesses and/or other real estate, and only 24
percent of husbands and 11 percent of wives had pensions at the
time of divorce. Furthermore, the family home was frequently the
couple's only large tangible community asset at the time of divorce.
Professor Weitzman found that among divorcing couples the median
equity in the family home in 1978 was close 'to $33,000
(approximately $53,100 in 1984 dollars). Other community property
assets, such as household furnishings, cars, and savings, amounted to
less than half the value of the family home.10
Thus, most families owning homes at the time of divorce face
the possibility of a forced family home sale. There are not enough
other community assets of sufficient value to permit the court to
award the family home to the wife and award other assets of equal
value to the husband. In order to avoid a forced sale, some women
may be forced to "bargain away" spousal support claims in order to
get their husbands to agree to award them the family home."
The forced sale of the family home at divorce can create severe
and unnecessary hardship for minor children of divorce and their
custodial parents, and for homemaker-spouses from marriages of
long duration.12 The Task Force is, therefore, recommending two
legislative proposals to encourage courts to temporarily defer the
sale of the family home in order to minimize the adverse economic
and emotional impact of divorce on these two groups. Neither
proposal constitutes a major change in current California law.
Instead, the proposals seek to "fine-tune" current law to more
adequately meet the needs of those most adversely affected by
immediate forced home sales.
Minor Children
Social scientists and legal experts have noted that loss of the
9 L WETZm.4, supra note 2, at 61-65.
10 I4
11 Id at 79-84. See also Leonard, The Disillusionment of Divorcefor Older Women, GREY
PAPER No. 6, OLDER WoMEN's LEAGUE (1980).
12 Id See also, infra note 13.
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family home at divorce intensifies the trauma children suffer from
the separation of their parents.5 Residential moves typically entail
a change in schools, disruption of the children's friendships,
neighborhood life, and extracurricular activities.14 Enabling children
to remain in the family home provides them with a source of
stability sorely needed during the disruption of divorce. 5
Loss of the family home can result in downward mobility and a
decline in the custodial mother and the children's standard of living
(mothers are the primary custodial parents in the great majority of
cases).16 Where the family home is sold by court order because the
custodial parent was unable to buy out the other's interest in the
home, it is unlikely that that parent will have sufficient post-divorce
earning capacity to buy a new comparable house in the same
neighborhood, even if the equity in the family home is divided
equally.
17
Instead, the custodial mother and children are often forced to
relocate to a smaller home or apartment in a less affluent
neighborhood. In fact, Wallerstein and Kelly's study on children of
divorce revealed a continuing pattern of residential moves.' They
13 J. WAuEESrEIN & J. BEiwN KuLLY, SURVIVING THE BREAKUP: How CHILDREN AND
PARENTS COPE Wm DIVORCE (1980); HEARING ON DIVORCE: THE IMPACT ON CHILDREN
AND FANHtuEs BEFORE THE SELECT COMMITrEE ON CHILDREN, YourH AND FAMIUmS, U.S.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 25 (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1987) (statement of Neil
Kalter, Associate Professor of Psychology and Psychiatry, University of Michigan) (June 19,
1986); J. EEKELAAR & M. MCCLEAN, MAINTENANCE AFTER DIVORCE (1986); Mary Ann
Glendon, Property Rights Upon Dissolution of Marriages and Informal Unions, in THE
CAMBRIDGE LECrURES 255 (N. Eastham & B. Krivy eds. 1982); J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD
& A. SOL.HT, IN THE BEsT INTEREST OF THE CHILD (1973).
14 Id.
15 Id,
16 J. WALUERsrEiN & J. BEiwN KELLY, supra note 13; HEARING ON DIVORC, supra note
13, at 2, 15-18, 19, 25, 82-87, 102; see also, T. ARENDEL, MoTHERS AND DIVORCE, LEGAL,
ECONOMIC, AND SOCIAL DILEMMAS 41 (1986).
17 Goodman, supra note 1. It is unlikely that either spouse, in the average divorce, will
have sufficient post-divorce assets or earning capacity to purchase comparable housing in the
same neighborhood immediately after divorce. However, as research has shown, men are
far more likely to recover financially after divorce than women (and, therefore, be in a
position to purchase another home of comparable value).
18 J. WALLEEsrEiN & J. BuN KELLY, supra note 13, at 183. See also, Public Hearing
Record, Hearing Before the Senate Task Force on Family Equity 61 (Oct. 16, 1986) (testimony
of Susan Speir [hereinafter Senate Public Hearing Record].
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found that within the first three years after divorce, "almost
two-thirds of the youngsters had changed their place of residence,
and a substantial number of these had moved three or more
times."'19 Wallerstein and Kelly also found that a move out of the
family home will have a particularly negative affect on children when
their (and their mother's) standard of living decreases while the
noncustodial parent's standard of living stays the same or increases.20
As explained by one divorced mother, remaining in the family home
provided the foundation for her and her children's recovery from
divorce:
Moving was my greatest fear. Rental costs for a family of four
- were out of sight, and there was still no money from our home
which had not yet been sold.... I got a sufficient loan from a
private party to buy the Title [sic] of the house my husband and.
I had jointly owned. It was just the right size for the four of us,
the older children could commute to college.., and the little one
could attend a good public school.... Ten years later, my older
daughters have good jobs and good marriages. My young son is
in his junior year [of college].... I believe that our stroke of luck
or "proof of God's care" was my getting title of our family home,
which not only supported us through thick and thin, but has
appreciated in value so that I don't feel embarrassed while living
there .... 21
California case law already recognizes the detriment to children
caused by the loss of their family home. In In re Maniage of Duke,
the court stated:
The value of the family home to its occupants cannot be measured
solely by its value in the marketplace. The longer the occupancy,
the more important these noneconomic factors become and the
more traumatic and disruptive a move to a new environment is to
children whose roots have become firmly entwined in the school
19 Id.
20 Id. at 183, 231.
21 See Senate Public Hearing Record, supra note 18, (written testimony submitted by J.
Chamberlin).
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and social milieu of their neighborhoods.22
The Duke court prescribed a balancing test, holding that sale of
the marital home must be deferred when the adverse emotional,
economic and social impact on minor children is not outweighed by
any economic detriment to the noncustodial spouse in delayed
receipt of his equity. Trial courts apparently continue to favor the
simpler method of forcing the sale of the family home to accomplish
an immediate equal division of property, rather than the more
complex balancing of interests required under Duke to determine if
a delayed sale is required.23 Subsequent appellate court decisions
have reflected confusion and conflicting opinions over the extent of
the trial courts' discretion in deferring immediate sale of the home,
in the face of the mandatory equal division language of Section
4800.24
Legislation is therefore necessary to codify the mandatory nature
of the Duke decision to prevent lengthy litigation on the issue, and
to create a presumption in favor of deferred sale of the family home
for the benefit and protection of minor children. Other states have
recognized the desirability of retaining the family home for the
benefit of children at divorce.2 For example, -the State of
Washington expressly requires courts when dividing the community
property to consider "the desirability of awarding the family home or
the right to live therein for reasonable periods to a spouse having
custody of any children . . ."6 Similarly, the Massachusetts
Governor's Commission on the Unmet Legal Needs of Children,
Subcommittee on Divorce and Custody recently recommended that:
it be presumed in law that the marital home asset not be sold or
disposed of until after a child reaches majority or completes a
reasonable formal education, whichever is later; unless it is clear
22 In re Marriage of Duke, 101 Cal. App. 3d 152, 155 (1980).
23 L WErrZMAN, supra note 2, at 79-84.
24 See, eg., In re Marriage of Gonzales, 116 Cal. App. 3d 556 (1981); Marriage of
Horowitz, 159 Cal. App. 3d 368 (1984).
25 See, ag., WASH. Ra-v. CODE § 26.09.080(4).
26 Id.
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upon the court's written findings that a child's welfare, emotional
well being, financial and education needs during minority have
been suitably provided for without regard to this asset or if the
facts show that it is not economically feasible.27
The Task Force is proposing legislation which would require a
deferred sale of a home where there are minor children upon
consideration of specified, child-related factors. An important
difference between the Task Force proposal and the Duke decision
is that the Task Force proposal minimizes the balancing of the
economic detriment of a deferred sale to the noncustodial or
"non-resident spouse" against the needs of the child. In cases where
a deferral of sale is necessary (i.e., where there are insufficient
other assets to make an outright award of the family home to the
custodial parent), the "non-resident spouse" will generally suffer
some economic detriment by not having immediate access to his or
her equity. The Task Force believes, however, that if the choice is
between economic detriment to the parent or economic and
emotional detriment to the child, responsibility for shouldering that
detriment should be placed upon the parent.
It may be useful to note that the economic "detriment" caused
to the "non-resident spouse" by the delay in obtaining his or her
equity in the home, may instead be viewed as an economic
investment in the child's future. By retaining equity in the family
home, the "non-resident parent" is providing a form of savings for
the child's future support needs and college expenses.
The Task Force proposal also addresses the concerns that
delayed sale of the family home would encourage custody contests
or discourage parents from agreeing to particular types of custody
arrangements, such as joint custody.2 The Task Force proposal
includes two provisions that protect against such misuse of the
custody issue. First, the Task Force proposal requires mandatory
awards of attorneys' fees if it is established that custody has been
contested for the purpose of avoiding a family home sale deferral.
27 MAssAcHusErms GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON THE UNMET LEGAL NEEDS OF
CHILDREN, REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITEE ON DIVORcE AND CUSrODY 4 (1986).
28 See Senate Public Hearing Record, supra note 18, (written testimony submitted by M.
Duryee, Director of Family Court Services of Alameda County).
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Thus, there is a financial disincentive to contesting custody for
economic reasons.
Second, the Task Force proposal does not limit family home
awards to' cases involving sole custody arrangements. The Task
Force proposal applies to any custodial parent, which could include
a joint custodian. Retaining the family home to provide stability
and continuity for children and lower-income joint custodial parents
is as necessary and applicable in joint custody as in sole custody
arrangements.
Marriages of Long Duration
Many women from marriages of long duration also face the
forced sale of the family home at divorce in order to accomplish an
'equal division" of the community property. (For a discussion of the
phrase "marriage of long duration" see spousal support
recommendation regarding presumption of permanent spousal
support). The longer the marriage, the more likely the couple is to
own a home. Professor Weitzman found that in families with
incomes between $20,000 and $30,000 a year, 57 percent of those
married five to ten years, 65 percent of those married eleven to
seventeen years, and 93 percent of those married eighteen years or
more owned homes at divorce. 9 As discussed earlier, for lower and
middle-income couples, the family home is likely to be the most
valuable, and often only, tangible community asset at divorce?°
The forced sale of the family home at divorce causes severe
economic and emotional hardship for many wives of long term
marriages who have often been homemakers for all or part of their
married lives.3' Unlike their ex-husbands, these women often have
no credit or job history, few or no marketable job skills, and little
income other than spousal and/or child support. For many of these
women, divorce marks their first entry into the paid job market on
a full-time basis. These circumstances render it virtually impossible
for these women to purchase a comparable home at divorce or
29 L WErrZMAN, supra note 2, at 65-66.
30 Id.
31 Id. at 82-83.
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even, for many, to obtain adequate new housing. Even with her
share of the equity from the family home, the older women's lower,
or virtual lack of, earning capacity often precludes her from
qualifying for a mortgage on a new home. In contrast, her
ex-husband will generally be eligible for a mortgage because of his
continued employment status and history, and earning capacity.
As noted by several witnesses at the Task Force's public hearing:
Quite often, in long-term marriages, the family home has a much
lower mortgage payment than comparable housing elsewhere.
This and other factors, such as poor health of the homemaker
spouse and deep emotional attachment, should be considered
when deciding if she will be allowed to remain in the home.
(Rosenfeld)
I would personally support, as a good family law concept, the
allocation of the family residence to a woman where even if that's
not an equal division. Many of times that has been her place of
work, her place of society, her entire place of life; and to deprive
her of it, I think, near the end of her life is not equitable.
(Kuehl)
I'm a single parent. I'm considered a displaced homemaker. I
was in a marriage 21 years plus. I have an adult dependent child.
... I have a severely developmentally disabled child. The home
was ordered sold. We have---we cannot afford to buy another
home. The legislators should take in consideration what happens
to the displaced homemaker with an adult dependent child who
can remain at home and that child's special need in also the
home. And I believe that the home should not be ordered sold,
and there should be the issue of taking more study regarding that.
(Cooper),
For many women of long-term marriages, divorce will mark the
end of their homeownership years. Their contributions and
sacrifices made during the marriage in order to own a home are
rendered meaningless; their lost earning capacity can never be
32 Senate Public Hearing Record, supra note 18, at 25, 87, 89.
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recaptured. In effect, these women are left in a position
comparable to that of a young adult, but without the benefits of
youth and a future.
For women who have dedicated their lives to raising children
and homemaking, losing the family home at divorce is akin to losing
their place of business, career, and center of their social status all
at once. Moving out of their long established neighborhoods and
away from friends often means social isolation. As noted by Task
Force member Frances Leonard, legal counsel for the Older
Women's League, unlike the ex-husband who leaves the marriage
with his career and "place of work" social network intact, the
homemaker-spouse experiences the emotional trauma of beginning
a new career at the same time that she loses her home and social
network.
33
Occasionally, women emerging from long marriages will be faced
with a choice between retaining the home or receiving spousal
support or other property, such as pension rights. In effect, these
women are forced to bargain away one element of survival in order
to secure another. A deferred sale of the home under these
circumstances would provide time and economic security for these
women to become adjusted to their new life.
Allowing the financially dependent spouse to remain in the
family home often will be economically more advantageous for both
spouses than forcing a sale of the home. The mortgage on a
long-established family home frequently is less than would be the
rent or mortgage for a smaller home or apartment. Sale of the
family home may require a higher spousal support award to
accommodate the significantly increased housing expenses that would
be incurred if the wife were forced to move.
Finally, deferring the sale of the family home recognizes the
unequal financial positions of spouses often present in long term
marriages, and provides an equitable remedy for equalizing their
post-divorce positions. It recognizes that the husband's continuing
earning capacity permits him to recover economically from the
33 Leonard, supra note 11; J. GmE, WOMEN IN THE MIDDLE YEARS: CURRENT
KNOWLEDGE AND DREcONS FOR RESEARCH AND PoucY 138-40 (1982); L SHIELDS,
DISPLACED HOMEMAKERS (1981).
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divorce much more quickly than the wife who is without an
adequate, let alone comparable, earning capacity. As noted in one
study, the financial discrepancy between women and men who were
forty years or older at the time of separation is dramatic: 80 percent
of the husbands were secure or very secure financially as compared
with only 20 percent of the women.34 Thus, the husband's deferred
receipt of his equity in the home is similar to the wife's deferred
ability to obtain, or increase, her earning capacity.
A deferred sale does not affect the equal division of property
pursuant to Civil Code Section 4800. The husband maintains his
interest in the home and is entitled to receive it upon the
occurrence of a change of circumstances. Civil Code Section 4800
does not require an immediate division of community property; the
statute expressly authorizes the court to reserve jurisdiction to make
a later division of property. Nor is delayed distribution of property
uncommon in California; courts often delay the distribution of a
husband's not yet vested pension benefits.35 Courts frequently
require wives to suffer "economic detriment!" by depriving them of
access to pension funds until they become vested rather than impair
,their value by ordering immediate distribution.
Despite the authority under current law to reserve jurisdiction
and delay the sale of the home, courts generally are reluctant to do
so. The Task Force is therefore recommending legislation that
would expressly authorize the court to defer the sale of the family
home in marriages of long duration, and to order it sold upon a
change of circumstances. The Task Force proposal constitutes
clarification of, and not a change in, current law.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
1) A custodial parent and minor child should not be forced out of the
family home because there are insufficient assets to award the home
to the custodial parent. The court "should be required, upon
consideration of specified child-related factors, to defer the sale of
34 Wallerstein, Women After Divorce: Preliminary Report From a 10-Year Follow-Up, AM.
J. OF ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 65-77 (1986).
35 See, e.g., Marriage of Ramer, 187 Cal. App. 3d 263 (1986) (court affirms reservation
of jurisdiction to distribute husband's pension).
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the home for the use and benefit of the custodial parent and minor
child in order to minimize the disruption caused the children by
separation of their parents. (Legislative Proposal No. 4)6
2) The court should defer the sale of the family home for the use and
benefit of a supported spouse in a marriage of long duration where
the adverse economic and emotional impact on the spouse resulting
from loss of the long established family home is not outweighed by
the economic detriment to the other spouse. (Legislative Proposal
No. 5)
IMPLEMENTATION:
1) Deferred Sale of Home Where Minor Children Involved: Add Civil
Code Section 4700.10 to require courts to defer the sale of the
family home and award temporary use and possession to a
custodial parent and minor children in order to minimize the
disruption caused by divorce. The proposed statute will specify
child-related factors that the court must consider in determining
whether a deferred sale of home order is required, and will specify
the duration of the order. The proposed statute will also require
the court to award reasonable attorneys' fees to a party requesting
a deferred sale of home order when the other party contests
custody primarily to avoid a deferred sale of home order.
2) Deferred Sale of Home in Marriages of Long Duration: Add Civil
Code Section 4800.10 expressly authorizing the court to defer the
sale of the family home and award its temporary use to a
supported spouse in a marriage of long duration where the court
determines that the adverse impact on that spouse of loss of the
family home is not outweighed by the economic detriment to the
other spouse. The deferred sale of home order could be modified
or terminated upon a change of circumstances. Remarriage of the
supported spouse would constitute a rebuttable presumption in
favor of immediate sale of the home.
36 Legislative Proposal No. 4 was introduced into Senate as SB 1341 by Senator Gary
Hart (D-Ventura, Los Angeles, Santa Barbara) and enacted into law as amended (Chapter





Despite the rapid rise in the divorce rate over the last two
decades, the percentage of women awarded spousal support has not
increased. The great majority of divorcing women (83 to 86
percent) are not awarded spousal support. Extravagant spousal
support awards were extremely rare under fault, and remain
extremely rare under no-fault. Professor Weitzman's research
revealed that in 1968, under fault, less than 20 percent of divorcing
women in California were awarded any spousal support; by 1978,
that percentage had dropped to 17 percent.' Similarly, the 1983
Federal Census data reveals that only 14 percent of divorcing women
in the country are awarded spousal support, and that this percentage
has remained unchanged since 1978.2
The average spousal support award, when awarded, does not
reflect either the standard of living established during the marriage
or the husband's ability to pay. The Federal Census data showed
an average spousal support award of less than $335 per month in
1983 and, as in 1978 and 1981, this amount averaged 22 percent of
the average male's income. Obviously, the average spousal support
award does not provide an adequate standard of living. In fac4 in
1983 the average spousal support award amounted to only 76 percent
of the poverty level income for that year.4
While women from marriages of long duration are more likely
to be awarded spousal support than other divorced women, the
majority of these longer-married women do not, in fact, receive any
spousal support. Only 46 percent of divorcing California women
1 L. WrrzMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC
CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA 167-69 (1985).
2 U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, Child Support and Alimony: 1983, CURRENT POPuLATION
REPORTS 4 (Series P-23, 1983).
3 Id. at 3.
4 Id.- at 4.
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married fifteen years or more were awarded spousal support in 1978;
more than half, then, were not awarded any support.-
Professor Weitzman's data, as published in The Divorce
Revolution, revealed that the most important change in spousal
support awards since the introduction of the no-fault reforms has
been the change in the duration of awards, the change from
"permanent," lifelong spousal support awards to short term awards.
6
In 1968, under fault, 62 percent of spousal support awards were
"permanent" or open-ended (for his or her life or until she
remarried); by 1977, under fault, only 32 percent of spousal support
awards were permanent: over two-thirds were for a fixed duration
and the average duration of these awards was twenty-five months,
or two years.
7
Mothers of preschool age children suffered the sharpest decline
in spousal support awards with the advent of no-fault. In 1968,
under fault, 20 percent of divorcing mothers with preschool age
children were awarded spousal support;. by 1978, under no-fault, this
percentage dropped to 13 percent.8 Thus, women least able to work
full-time in the paid work market because of the age of their
children and with the highest child care costs (since their children
have not entered public school yet), are the least likely to receive
a spousal support award.
Women and the Labor Market
The failure of courts to award spousal support in 86 percent of
divorces is attributable, in part, to judges' belief that ,women are
capable of self-sufficiency because they can easily find well paid jobs
to support themselves and their children.9 In actuality, the job
market for women remains dismal and discriminatory. As the U.S.
Supreme Court recently stated, women are still struggling for "the
5 L WErIZMAN, supra note 1, at 169, 187.
6 I at 164-65.
7 Id. at 165.
8 I at 185-87.
9 Larson, Equity and Economics: A Case for Spousal Suppor4 8 GOLDEN GATE U.L
REv. 443-46 (1979).
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basic right to participate fully and equally in the workforce, without
denying them the fundamental right to full participation in family
life."10
Despite the rapid influx of women into the paid job market over
the last two decades, a woman seeking employment will find only a
limited number of jobs available. Women remain concentrated in
a very small number of occupations, with low pay and limited
opportunity for advancement. In 1981, half of the 43,000,000
women in the paid labor force were employed in only twenty
occupations: secretary, bookkeeper, salesclerk retail worker, cashier,
waitress, registered nurse, elementary school teacher, private
household worker, typist, nursing aide, sewer and stitcher, cook,
receptionist, secondary school teacher, assembler, bank teller,
building interior cleaner, hairdresser, cleaner and servant, and
childcare worker." Moreover, the disparity between wives' and
husbands' earnings is still substantial. In 1983, wives' average
earnings were only 44% of what their spouses brought home. 1
Comparable educational attainment does not decrease this disparity,
nor do women fare better in higher paying job categories such as
the professions or skilled technician positions. 3
Finally, men are far more likely than women to own their own
business. Data from the Bureau of Census reveals thatwomen own
6nly 7 percent of all businesses. 14
10 California Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987).
11 BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, EMPLOYMENT AND
EARNINGS (1982).
12 One-fifth of Worldng Wives Earn More Than Husbands, Study Shows, Orange County
Register, May 7, 1986, at A16.
13 Data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics shows, for instance, that in the third quarter
of 1983 men in service occupations had median weekly wages of $258, vhile women in
service occupations earned $176 per week; and male administrative support workers including
clericals had median weekly earnings of $370 per week, whereas women in this classification
had median weekly earnings of $248 per week. Men in sales occupations earned a median
weekly income of $407, whereas women in sales occupations earned $208. Male executives,
managers and administrators earned $568 weekly, but females in this job classification earned
$347. BuREAu OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP"r OF LABOR, EARNINGS OF WORKERS AND
THEIR FAMIuES, Tables 4 and 5 (Oct. 3, 1983).
14 WOMEN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, FACTs ON U.S. WORKING WOMEN, Fact
Sheet No. 85-5 (July 1985).
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The Older Homemaker
The economic problems encountered by women after divorce are
intensified for those women who have worked as full-time
homemakers during the marriage. 5 These women are part of an
increasingly large category of "displaced homemakers," a term used
to describe a woman between the ages of thirty-five and sixty-four
who has functioned as a homemaker for an extended period of time
but is now required by divorce, separation, or widowhood to enter
the paid work force in order to support herself or her family.
16
In the absence of adequate spousal support awards, displaced
homemakers may face a bleak financial plight. Divorce generally
leaves these women with little or no source of support; their age
and lack of marketable skills make self-support difficult (and
sometimes impossible). When they attempt to enter the labor force,
they face two kinds of discrimination: sex bias and age bias. A
survey by the National Displaced Homeworkers Network in 1979
disclosed that the most frequent areas of employment for these
older women were secretarial, clerical, and health and social services,
and that their average annual salary in these areas was between
$5,520 and $6,720.17
Many displaced homemakers may be forced to rely upon Social
Security benefits. Unfortunately, examination of the Social Security
system shows that such reliance is misplaced. Divorced women who
have worked within the home for all or most of their married lives
are eligible to receive Social Security benefits only if their marriage
lasted at least ten years.' 8 If a woman is eligible, the most she can
receive while her former husband is alive is an amount equal to half
of his benefits19 (he receives the full amount) which is rarely
15 Hauserman, Homemakers and Divorce: Problems of the Invisible Occupadon, 17 FAM.
LQ. 41, 45-46 (1983).
16 Sara McCarthy, Summary of Research on the Older Displaced Homemaker 1 (Sept.
1986) (unpublished memorandum prepared for the Senate Task Force on Family Equity).
17 NEw JERSEY INSlMUE FOR CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION, How TO VALUE TH
HoMEMAKERs CONTRmUTION IN PERSONAL INJURY AND MAIMoNIAL CASES 168 (1984).
18 42 U.S.C. § 402(b)(1)(G) (1986).
19 42 U.S.C. § 402(b)(2) (1986).
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sufficient for survival.2°
Women who are employed in the paid labor force, and who
therefore are potentially eligible for Social Security in their own
right, fare little better. The average monthly benefit received by a
retired woman in 1983 was significantly less than that received by a
male retiree. Because of a combination of complex factors,
including segregation of women in low paying jobs as discussed
earlier, and penalties created by the Social Security system for time
taken out of the paid labor force to bear and rear children, many
employed women may actually be better off by forfeiting their own
Social Security contributions and receiving benefits as a dependent
spouse.21 Currently, about one-third of retired female workers are
"dually entitled," i.e., receive higher benefits as spouses than as
workers.22
Pension benefits, a major source of income for retired people,
are "usually necessary to maintain an adequate standard of living in
old age."23 But women, whether working as homemakers or in the
paid labor force, rarely have pension coverage.u In 1984, only 20
percent of older women, i.e., one in five, received a pension, as
contrasted with 43.2 percent of elderly men.2 Thus, most older
divorced women are not able to be economically independent on the
strength of pension benefits.
Since work done within the home has not traditionally been
viewed as having economic value, pensions have not been available
to homemakers in their own right.6 Because homemakers do not
have access to pension coverage on their own, they are rendered
particularly vulnerable by divorce.
Due to all of the above factors, spousal support is necessary to
20 See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON PENSION POLICY, WORKING PAPERS: WORKING
WOMEN, MARRIAGE AND Rmpnmmr 6 (1980).
21 42 U.S.C. § 402(9) (1986).
22 Soc. SEc. BULL., ANN. STAISncAL SuPr., Table No. 106 (1984-85).
23 U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, WOMEN AND PRIVATE PENSION PLANS ii (1980).
24 See generally, PRESIDENTS COMMISSION ON PENSION Policy, supra note 20, at 29-41.
25 Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, March 1985 Current Population
Survey (unpublished data).
26 See U.S. DEr"T OF JUSTICE, THE PENSION GAME: THE AMERICAN PENSION SYSTEM
FROM THE VIElwpotNr OF THE AVERAGE WOMAN 4-6 (1979).
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meet the economic crisis of the displaced homemaker and other
dependent spouses. It should be viewed as a form of legal
insurance, protection, or pension for the spouse who has given
priority to the other spouse's career and to child rearing instead of
developing his or her own career or marketable skills.
Divorced Women with Dependent Children
Despite the increased numbers of women in the paid labor
market, the majority of married women with children do not work
full time outside the home. Bureau of Labor statistics show that
only 39 percent of married mothers living with their husbands work
full time outside the home. Thus, during marriage close to
two-thirds of mothers interrupt their careers and paid work
experience for the purposes of homemaking and childrearing.27
When a mother devotes herself to childcare and homemaking
during marriage, she typically foregoes or delays education, training,
and the opportunity to invest in her career. As a result, her job
opportunities and earning capacity are significantly and permanently
impaired: for each year out of the paid labor market, a woman
suffers an average permanent lifetime reduced earning capacity of
1.2 percent.2 For college-educated women, the decrease can be as
high as 4.3 percent for each year.29 A two-to-four year break will
lower average earnings by 13 percent, and a five-year break will
lower earnings by 19 percent.?° Divorce, therefore, leaves these
women with serious financial difficulties regardless of the length of
their marriage. The demands of single parenthood curtail women's
earning potential, forcing them into discontinuous work patterns,
part-time employment and jobs with low promotional opportunity.
Due to their low or reduced income potential resulting from
27 Besharov and Dally, How Much Are Working Mothers Working?, 2 STATE REPORT ON
WOMEN'S RIGHTS 11-13 (Nov./Dec 1986); Besharov and Dally, One Policy for Working Moms
Won't Fit A14 Wall St. J., Oct. 29, 1986, at 28.
28 Krauskopf, Maintenance:A Decade of Developmen4 50 Mo. L. REv. 261 (1985) (citing
Mincer & Polacheck, Women's Earnings Reexamined, 13 J. HUM. RESOURCES 120-21 (1978)).
29 Id.
30 ECONOMIC PoUcY CouNcL UNA-USA, WORK AND FAMIy IN THE UNrrED STATES:
A PoucY INIATIvE, REPORT OF THE FAMILY PoucY PANEL 53 (1985).
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homemaking responsibilities during and after the marriage,
inadequate child support awards, the failure of some fathers to make
child support payments, the reluctance of courts to award spousal
support, and the low amounts awarded, many of these
female-headed families must supplement their income with welfare
aid. As of 1979, more than 90 percent of the families receiving
AFDC involved divorced, separated, or unwed parents.31
Although the need for spousal support has been considered in
relation to the woman's responsibilities for child care, the need for
spousal support does not end with the termination of these
responsibilities. Once her children are no longer dependent, the
woman may be middle-aged and encounter all the difficulties of the
displaced homemaker in the job market. If she has been able to
remain at home, she will be without marketable skills; if she has
been employed part-time, she will have missed opportunities for
advancement and will probably not be eligible for retirement or
health benefits.
Remarriage
Remarriage--like employment, Social Security, public assistance,
and pensions--does not provide any reasonable assurance of financial
support for divorced women.32 "The likelihood of a woman's
remarriage is largely a function of her age."33 While three out of
four women who are under thirty at the time of divorce remarry,
the likelihood of remarriage declines precipitously for women who
are over thirty at the time of divorce. in 1980, "for women,
divorcing between thirty and forty, the proportion is closer to 50%,
and for those women who are over forty at divorce, the likelihood
of remarriage is only 28 percent.34 More recent Census data
31 MAxiMus, INC., EVALUATION OF THE CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM: FINAL
REPORT (prepared for Office of Research Statistics ES4) (Soc. Sec. Admin. Contract
Number 600-82-0089) (April 1983), cited in N.Y.S. COMMISSION ON CHILD SUPPORT, REPORT
9 (October 1, 1985).
32 L. WErTZMAN, supra note 1, at 204.
33 Id.; BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE,
WIDOWHOOD, AND REMARRIAGES BY FAMILY CHARACTERISTICS 8 (Series P-20, August 1977).
34 L. WErzMA, supra note 1, at 204.
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indicate that the proportion of women who will eventually remarry
after divorce is even lower.3 5
Economic necessity, exacerbated by employment discrimination
on the basis of age, sex, and family responsibilities, and equity itself
require that spousal support be awarded in amounts that fairly
compensate a woman for her contribution to her marriage, and for
her childrearing responsibilities both during marriage and after
divorce. The Task Force recommends the following legislative
proposals as means of achieving this goal.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR LEGISLATION
1. STANDARDS AND FACTORS
Spousal support awards should be based on the standard of living
established by the parties during the marriage, except in marriages of
long duration where spousal support should serve to equalize the
standards of living in the households of both parties after divorce.
(Legislative Proposal No. 13)6
IMPLEMENTATION:
1) Amend Civil Code Section 4801 to expressly require courts to base
spousal support awards on the standard of living established during
the marriage, except that in marriages of long duration, spousal
support shall serve to equalize the standards of living in both
parties' households. (Legislative Proposal No. 13)
2) Amend Civil Code Section 4801(a)(1)(B) to require courts to
consider the reduced or lost lifetime earning capacity of the
supported spouse as a result of having forgone or delayed
education, training, employment, or career opportunities during
the marriage. (Legislative Proposal No. 13)
35 Norton & Moorman, Current Trends in Marriage and Divorce AmongAmerican Women,
49 J. MARRAGE AND FAg. 5, 13 (1987).
36 Legislative Proposal No. 13 was introduced into Senate as SB 1296 by Senator Gary
Hart (D-Ventura, Los Angeles, Santa Barbara) and enacted into law as amended (Chapter
407, Statutes of 1988).
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3) Amend Civil Code Section 4801 to include an express definition
of "ability to pay" of the supporting spouse. (Legislative Proposal
No. 13)
DISCUSSION:
As discussed in the findings, the divorce reform laws brought
sweeping changes in the theory and practice underlying alimony, or
spousal support law. Under the fault system, the primary factor for
awarding alimony was fault: wives were presumed financially
dependent upon their husbands, and were entitled to alimony on the
theory of punishing a husband for breach of his marital contract.37
The innocent wife was entitled to the benefits promised under the
marriage contract, to wit, financial support:
The theory of [the] ... requirement [of Civil Code Ssection 139]
is that the husband entered upon an obligation which bound him
to support his wife during the period of their joint lives, that by
his own wrong he has forced her to sever the relation..., and
that he is required to make compensation for the offense
committed by him which has deprived her of benefit of the
obligation.3
The no-fault divorce reforms eliminated fault as a grounds for
alimony. The primary standard for spousal support became
"financial need" of one spouse and "ability to pay" of the other.
39
However, as Professor Weitzman and others have noted, judicial
interpretation and application of this standard has resulted in
economic hardship to women.40 Under the fault system, wives were
presumed financially dependent on their husbands. Under the
37 Larson, supra note 9, at 443-51.
38 Webber v. Webber, 33 Cal. 2d 153, 157-158; see Larson, supra note 9, at 451.
39 Larson, supra note 9, at 452 (cases cited therein).
40 L. WErZ.MAN, supra note 1, at 143, 184-214; Krauskopf, supra note 28, at 259, 317-20;
Cohen & Hillman, ANALYSIS oF SEVENTY SELECr DECISIONS AFrER TRIAL UNDER NEW
YoRK STATE'S EourrABLE DMIBsUON LAW 13-14 (November 1, 1984), excerpted at 4 N.J.
FAM. LAW. 85 (1985).
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divorce reforms, which intended to treat men and women equally at
divorce, courts have interpreted this to mean that wives are
presumed to be capable of supporting themselves at divorce and are
therefore not financially in need of spousal support.41 For those
women who prove that they are financially in need of support, the
courts presume that such need will be shortlived.42 The courts
assume that these women can quickly enter the paid labor market,
and become self-supporting. Thus, spousal support awards, as
described in the findings, are typically of short duration and
inadequate amounts.
This assumption of "self-sufficiency" is unfounded and particularly
devastating for homemakers from marriages of long duration and
divorced women with dependent children. It ignores the reality of
the paid labor market.43 It ignores the fact that many of these wives
have sacrificed their own career opportunities and earning potential
because of tacit or express marital partnership agreements. Finally,
such assumptions devalue or minimize the contributions of the
homemaker-spouse toward the marital standard of living.
44
Judicial devaluation of the contributions of homemaker-spouses
are reflected in the inadequate amounts of spousal support, when
awarded. Spousal support awards are supposed to be based upon
the "reasonable needs" of the spouse seeking support. However,
many courts interpret "reasonable needs" as subsistence level.45
While "standard of living" is one of the factors the courts are
required to consider in determining spousal support awards under
Civil Code Section 4801,46 lack of serious consideration of this factor
is reflected in the low amounts of support awards.
Judicial failure to utilize spousal support as a means of valuing
homemaking contributions and equalizing the economic burdens of
41 L WE4ZMAN, supra note 1, at 32-36, 164-67, 187-94.
42 Id. at 164-67.
43 See, &g., Public Hearing Record, Hearing Before the Senate Task Force on Family Equity
82-83 (Oct. 16, 1986) (research reported by Dr. Wendy Lozano) [hereinafter Senate Public
Hearing Record].
44 Id. at 373; see also, Krauskopf, supra note 28; Cohen & Hillman, supra note 40.
45 L. WEnrlzMA, supra note 1, at 172-73; Cohen & Hillman, supra note 40.
46 CAL. CIV. CODE § 4801(a)(8); see Marriage of Ramer, 187 Cal. App. 3d 263 (1986).
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divorce have been recognized in other states. In 1986, the New
York Legislature amended its maintenance (spousal support) law to
require courts to define "reasonable needs" as the "standard of living
established during the marriage."47 In enacting this law, the New
York Legislature explained:
... [The] language of our maintenance provisions which refers
to the 'reasonable need of a party' has been interpreted as a
subsistence standard for women.... The maintenance provisions
are being incorrectly interpreted by the court to deny indefinite
(permanent) maintenance to divorced women who come away
from long term marriages or short term marriages where there are
young children to be cared for. Current interpretations . . .
contribute to the 'feminization of poverty.' ... There is something
wrong with the way the court views what is 'reasonable' for
women to have. In general it is not looking at hard economic
data in making maintenance awards. The court must be directed
to maintain the parties at the same percentage of the standard of
living they enjoyed together during the marriage, especially in long
term marriages and short term marriages where there is a child
or children to care for.4
Adequate spousal support awards are essential to equalizing the
economic consequences of divorce between men and women. The
awards reflect societal perceptions of the importance and values of
homemaking and childrearing contributions and sacrifices made
during the marriage. It is interesting to note that the large majority
of divorced people (both men and women) believe that, "a woman
deserves alimony if she's been married a long time and is too old to
get a good job."49
The Task Force is therefore recommending changes to Civil
Code Section 4801 in order to improve the adequacy of spousal
support awards. The Task Force legislative proposal seeks to
establish the goal and primary standard for spousal support awards
47 A.10567-A/S.8908-A, amending N.Y. DoM. REL. LAw § 236(B)(1)(a).
48 IL, Memorandum in Support of Legislation.
49 L. WEr-ZMAN, supra note 1, at 152, 154-56.
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as the standard of living established during the marriage, 50 except
in marriages of long duration where the goal would be equalizing
the standard of living of the two post-divorce households. (See
Recommendation No. 2, regarding presumption of permanent
spousal support, for discussion of definition of "long term" marriage.)
The "marital standard of living" standard provides a cut-off point
for short marriages, i.e., the spouse seeking support would not be
able to take advantage of the increased standard of living of the
supporting spouse, but would instead be bound by the standard of
living established during the marriage.
A different standard is being proposed for marriages of long
duration because of the longlasting, permanent effects of such
marriages. In effect, the spouses have incurred lifelong
responsibilities and benefits because of their long marriage.
In addition to the new standards for spousal support, the Task
Force is also recommending that Civil Code Section 4801 be
amended to include factors that expressly define "ability to pay" of
the supported spouse, and require courts to consider a supported
spouse's lifelong (permanent) reduced or impaired earning capacity
due to contributions and sacrifices to the family during the marriage.
(One member of the Task Force, Marvin Chapman, dissented from
the majority opinion on this recommendation because he had
concerns about how reduced earning capacity could be proved).
2. A PRESUMPTION OF PERMANENT SPOUSAL SUPPORT
IS APPROPRIATE IN MARRIAGES OF LONG DURATION
Courts should be required to retain jurisdictioi over spousal
support in cases involving marriages of long duration. (Legislative
Proposal No. 14)5'
IMPLEMENTATION:
Amend Civil Code Section 4801(d) to require courts to retain
50 See Marriage of Ramer, 187 Cal. App. 3d 263 (1986).
51 Legislative Proposal No. 14 was introduced into Senate as SB 907 by Senator Bill
Lockyer (D-Alameda) and enacted into law as amended (Chapter 1086, Statutes of 1987).
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jurisdiction over spousal support in marriages of long duration,
unless the parties have expressly otherwise agreed in writing.
(Legislative Proposal No. 14)
DISCUSSION:
Professor Weitzman's research revealed that one of the most
significant changes created by the divorce reforms was the shift from
permanent, or open-ended, alimony awards to awards of short or
limited duration. 2 In 1968, under fault, 62 percent of alimony
awards were "permanent" or of indefinite duration, typically for "his
or her life until further order of the court", or until remarriage. By
1977, under no-fault, only 32 percent of spousal support awards
were open-ended. Most spousal support awards, over two-thirds, are
now short term awards, with an average duration of approximately
two years.53
The shift from permanent to short-term spousal support awards
has had a devastating effect on women of marriages of long
duration. By 1977, the California Supreme Court and appellate
courts realized this injustice. In In re Marriage of Brantner, the
court stated:
A woman is not a breeding cow to be nurtured during her years
of fecundity, then conveniently and economically converted into
cheap steaks-when past her prime.... [T]he husband simply has
to face up to the fact that his support responsibilities are going to
be of extended duration--perhaps for life. This has nothing to do
with feminism, sexism, male chauvinism, or any other trendy social
ideology. It is ordinary common sense, basic decency, and simply
justice.54
Despite such clear statements of lavy, trial courts continue to fail to
recognize the permanent support responsibilities created by
52 L. WErrLMAN, supra note 1, at 164-65.
53 Id. at 165.
54 In Re Marriage of Brantner, 67 Cal. App. 3d 416, 419-20 (1977).
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marriages of long duration.55
The Task Force is, therefore, recommending legislation that
would codify current case law by expressly requiring courts to
permanently permanently jurisdiction over spousal support in
marriages of long duration. The proposal does not, however,
require courts to enter a permanent spousal support order. Under
the Task Force recommendation, a court could still order spousal
support for a limited number of years; however, at the end of that
specified period, the court would still have jurisdiction allowing a
supported spouse to return to court for additional support or
modification of support based on proof of continued need.
The Task Force proposal does not define "marriage of long
duration" for three reasons. First, the Task Force felt that
definition is better left to the discretion of the courts to determine
on a case-by-case basis. The Task Force feared that a statutory
definition would encourage abuse. For example, if the statute
established ten years as a "marriage of long duration", a party might
file for divorce after nine years in order to avoid permanent
retention of jurisdiction. Second, there is already a body of
California case law defining marriages of long duration.
Finally, the Task Force proposal reflects the need for the law
and the courts to have flexibility sufficient to meet the changing
realities of marriage in society. The current average length of
marriage is 7.5 years.56 The federal government has recently
recognized the changing nature of marriage by lowering its-.
"length-of-marriage" requirements for certain retirement benefits
from 20 to ten years.
57
Again, the Task Force proposal is in essence a codification of
existing case law. Statutory codification is necessary in order to
avoid the abuse of discretion at the trial court level, and the
subsequent costs and burdens of appeals.
55 See, e.g, Marriage of Ramer, 187 Cal. App. 3d 263 (1986).
56 Norton & Moormon, supra note 35, at 6.
57 See, eg., Civil Service Retirement Spouse Equity Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-615, 98
Stat. 3195 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 8331 (1988)).
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3. REMARRIAGE:
Remarriage should not automatically terminate spousal support.
The courts should have the discretion to continue, suspend, or
terminate support based on the supported spouse's proof of continued
need. Current law improperly creates an irrebuttable presumption
based solely on marital status, rather than on proof of actual need.
(Legislative Proposal No. 15)
IMPLEMENTATION:
Amend Civil Code Section 4801(b) to delete "remarriage" as a
grounds for automatic termination of spousal support. (Legislative
Proposal No. 15)
DISCUSSION:
The basis for spousal support pursuant to Civil Code Section
4801 is the need of one spouse and the ability to pay of the other
spouse, after consideration of various factors listed in Civil Code
Section 4801(a).
Civil Code Section 4801.5 creates a presumption of decreased
need of spousal support when the supported spouse is cohabiting
with a member of the opposite sex. The burden is on the spouse
receiving support to show a continuing need in order to avoid
termination or suspension of the support order.
In contrast, Civil Code Section 4801(b) automatically terminates
support upon remarriage, thereby creating an irrebuttable
presumption that the spouse is neither entitled to, nor has a
continuing need for support based solely on her marital status. The
court has no discretion to continue support, regardless of actual
need.
Section 4801(b) is unnecessary and violates public policy
encouraging marriage. Automatic termination of support because
of remarriage chills the supported spouse's right to marry (giving rise
to this provision's nickname as the "chastity belt" law). Under
current law, cohabitation, rather than remarriage, is encouraged
since a cohabiting "spouse" receiving support from her former
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husband can still receive that support by demonstrating continuing
need.
The Task Force believes the discrepancy between the two sets
of rules is inappropriate. It creates incentives to cohabit rather than
marry, which should not be the public policy of the State of
California.
Section 4801(b) also reflects sex-based stereotypes. Automatic
termination of support because of remarriage presumes that a
woman, by acquiring a husband, automatically acquires a means of
support or income despite any agreements or arrangements
otherwise. A man, however, is not presumed by his remarriage and
acquisition of a new wife, to have likewise automatically acquired
additional income. If former husbands who remarried were subject
to the same assumptions regarding their new spouses, men paying
support would be subject to automatic increases in their support
obligations because of remarriage.
The effect of Section 4801(b)'s automatic termination of support
upon remarriage is particularly harsh on older women from
marriages of long duration who, in direct response to the emotional
devastation and disruption of their long marriage, immediately
remarry. When these "rebound" marriages are short-lived, these
older women have lost their right to spousal support from their first,
long marriage, and generally are not awarded support from the
second marriage because of its short duration. While only a small
percentage of older women are affected by Section 4801(b), since
only 28 percent of women over age forty remarry58 , these women
are often left destitute.
Younger women with short-term support orders, would probably
not be affected since, while they are more likely to remarry than
older women, their support orders are also more likely to terminate
by reason of the short duration of the first marriage, than by the
fact of remarriage termination.
The Task Force proposal does not require or guarantee
continued support after remarriage. By deleting the "remarriage
termination" provision from Section 4801(b), current Civil Code
Section 4801.5 would apply to all cases involving cohabitation
58 L. WErzMi, supra note 1, at 204.
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(regardless of actual marital status). Women who remarry and
women who cohabit without marrying would not be treated
differently. In both cases, the court would have discretion. It would
evaluate the need for support based on consideration of the various
factors in Section 4801(a), instead of making the decision to
terminate on the basis of marital status and sex-based stereotypes.
(One Task Force member, Marvin Chapman, opposed this proposal,
commenting that second marriages should be viewed as life long
commitments.)
4. VOCATIONAL COUNSELLING AND TRAINING
Older homemakers should not be forced to obtain employment that
is not commensurate with the standard of living established during the
marriage or that is not appropriate for their age, education or skills.
(Legislative Proposal No. 16)59
IMPLEMENTATION:
1) Amend Civil Code Section 4801(e) to require that any
examination by a vocational training consultant include
assessment of the spouse's ability to find employment in the
paid labor market commensurate with that spouse's
education, skills, age, and marital standard of living.
(Legislative Proposal No. 16)
2) Amend Civil Code Section 4801 by adding a provision that
requires courts to order the supporting spouse to pay for part
or all of the expenses necessary for retraining or education
of the spouse seeking support where it is determined that
such training or education would enhance the supported
spouse's earning capacity. (Legislative Proposal No. 16)
59 Legislative Proposal No. 16 was introduced as SB 1615 by Senator Marks in 1988 and
vetoed. Senator Marks reintroduced the bill as SB 738 in 1989.
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DISCUSSION:
Under the present Section 4801(e), a court can require a party
to submit to an examination by a vocational education counselor.
The purpose of this examination is to assist the court in determining'
the earning capacity of the spouse seeking spousal support, and
therefore the need for and amount of support.
While an examination by a vocational education counselor may
help some, especially younger, women to determine their marketable
skills, for many women the experience is likely to be somewhat
demeaning? °  Task Force members working with displaced
homemakers reported that many women felt that the examination
was forced on them as a prerequisite to getting any award of
spousal support at all. Under those circumstances, the examination,
was reported to be a humiliating and punitive experience.
For the older homemaker with little or no marketplace job
experience, the requirement is not only humiliating, it is also likely
to result in unrealistic assessments. Such women have had long
careers as homemakers and mothers, and are understandably upset
or confused by a process which evaluates only their saleable skills,
without regard to their proven abilities. To a woman who has spent
twenty years raising children, balancing the household budget,
preparing food, nursing the ill, chauffeuring the family, and
arranging a social calendar, an evaluation that she is employable at
a fast food outlet is a painful and unfair devaluation of her life and
homemaking career.
The Task Force recommends, therefore, that any such vocational
assessment of a spouse seeking support be made in light of that
spouse's marital lifestyle, and commensurate with that spouse's
education, age skills, and marital standard of living. This will protect
against the unreasonable assumption that a woman who, for
example, was employed only sporadically, or before the children
were born, can readily turn that work experience into an appropriate
income through full-time employment.
60 See Written Testimony of J. Rosenthal, Public Hearing Record, October 16, 1986;
Miller & Spungin, Economic Independence: VocationalAssewsents and Spousal Support LA.
LAW. 20 (March 1984).
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The Task Force recommendation will also clarify current law
that permits the vocational training and education assessment to be
requested by either party. Thus, a spouse seeking support who is to
be evaluated to determine her future earning capacity and her need
for support may also request an evaluation of the supporting
spouse's ability to earn money to pay the support requested. This
is to protect the supported spouse against breach of support
obligations caused by intentional unemployment or underemployment
of the supporting spouse.
Courts often order reduced spousal support or "step-down"
orders on the basis of vocational consultants' projections of earning
capacity and future self-sufficiency. These projections are typically
based on the assumption that the supported spouse will acquire
additional education or training. However, the courts often neglect
to award funds sufficient to cover the cost of such training or
education, leaving the spouse seeking support with no means of
obtaining the skills which would render support unnecessary.
The Task Force, therefore, recommends that Civil Code Section
4801 be amended to require courts to order the supporting spouse
to pay all or part of the costs and expenses of any retraining or
education that would enhance the supported spouse's earning
capacity. The amount of such order would be based on the
supporting spouse's ability to 1ay and with consideration of the tax
consequences.
5. SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT
Effective enforcement of spousal support orders is necessary to
alleviate the impoverishment of women and children resulting from
divorce. (Legislative Proposal No. 17)61
IMPLEMENTATION:
1) Amend Civil Code Section 4801.6 to require that initial
spousal support orders include mandatory wage assignments
61 Legislative Proposal No. 17 was introduced into Senate as SB 1614 by Senator Marks
and enacted into law as amended (Chapter 969, Statutes of 1988).
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that automatically go into effect upon one-month's default in
payment. (Legislative Proposal No. 17)
2) Expand the power of the district attorney support
enforcement units to enforce spousal support orders even in
those cases where there are no child support orders, and to
provide 100 percent state funding to implement this mandate.
(Legislative Proposal No. 18)
DISCUSSION:
Noncompliance with spousal support orders exacerbates the
economic hardships of divorce on women and children. Spousal
support is as crucial a component as child support to the economic
well-being of the post-divorce household. In some cases, spousal
support may be even more important than child support in meeting
the financial needs of divorced women and their children. For
example, spousal support is sometimes awarded in lieu of, or in
exchange for, lower child support awards because of tax benefits to
the obligor-spouse. In these cases, failure to pay spousal support is
tantamount to nonpayment of child support. Similarly, in cases
involving older women without minor children and therefore without
child support orders, spousal support may be the main, if not the
only, means of financial survival after divorce.
The federal government has recognized the importance of
spousal support to the financial well-being of women and children
after divorce. The 1984 Child Support Amendments expressly
expanded the duty and authority of state child support enforcement
agencies (in California, the district attorney's office) to enforce
spousal support orders as well as child support orders.62
Data on compliance with spousal support orders indicates that
compliance with these orders is only minimally better than it is with
child support orders.6 Professor Weitzman's research showed that
62 Child Support Amendments of 1984, Public Law 98-378, codified at 42 U.S.C. §
654(4)(B) and (6)(A); see Dodson & Horowitz, Child Support Enforcement Amendments of
1984: New Tools for Enforcement 10 Fam. L Rep. (BNA) 3051, 3060 (October 23, 1984).
63 Child Support and Alimony: 1983, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CURRENT POPULATION
RETORis, Series P-23, No. 141, 1-4.
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in 1977, one out of six husbands was in arrears in spousal support
payments within six months of the divorce decree.6
Effective, swift, and inexpensive enforcement of spousal support
orders is essential to alleviating the economic hardships of divorce
on women and children. Frequently, it is not economically feasible
for women to enforce a spousal support order. Where, for example,
the typical award is about $4,400 per year for two years Le., a total
award of only $8,800,6 legal fees and other costs incurred in
enforcing such an award could easily exceed the amount of the total
award itself.
There are strong public policy grounds for providing effective
enforcement of spousal support orders as well. The state has a
legitimate interest in obtaining respect for and compliance with its
court orders. As such, spousal support orders are not merely a
matter of the private affairs between ex-spouses. Further, spousal
support orders also reflect, in part, the financial contributions,
sacrifices, and responsibilities made and created by both parties
during marriage. Public policy demands that those responsibilities
and obligations be valued and respected, lest the institution of
marriage itself become devalued.6 7
The Task Force is proposing two remedies for effective
enforcement of spousal support orders. The first proposal would
require all spousal support orders to include wage assignments that
would automatically go into effect upon failure of the obligor-spouse
to pay one month's obligation. Current law already requires
mandatory wage assignments for delinquent spousal support obligors.
The Task Force proposal merely eliminates the need on the part of
the supported spouse to return to court to petition for a wage
assignment, thereby saving substantial legal costs and court time.
The Task Force also recommends that the existing child support
enforcement units of the district attorneys' offices be empowered to
enforce spousal support in cases where there is no concurrent child
64 L. WFrzMm., supra note 1, at 192.
65 Id. at 171.
66 See Testimony of Professor Sheila Kuehl, Public Hearing Record, October 16, 1986.
67 See, Krauskopf, Maintenance: A Decade of Development 50 Mo. L. REv. 259, 317-
20, (1985).
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support order in effect. Thus, the two Task Force proposals reduce
the burdens and costs presently imposed on the supported spouse,
and shift the burden of compliance to the obligor.
6. ATTORNEY FEES
Efforts should be made to insure that both spouses have access to
funds with which to retain legal counsel.
IMPLEMENTATION:
The Judicial Council and the state bar should examine the
feasibility of awarding attorney's fees at the beginning of an
action/proceeding where one spouse has no or limited income due
to not having been employed outside the home or where one spouse
does not have access to the community property.
DISCUSSION:
The Task Force received testimony that, as women are typically
the lower earning spouse, lack of funds for attorneys' fees is a major
problem. While payment of attorney's fees can be a hardship on
both parties to a dissolution proceeding, it is especially a problem
for women who have been homemakers and have little or no source
of income other than their husbands' earnings, and who may not
have a credit history in their own name. Without the funds to pay
an attorney, a homemaker spouse is effectively denied adequate
legal representation and is, therefore, denied due process of law.
The lack of funding for attorneys' fees for women is also an
issue for family law attorneys. At least two attorneys told the Task
Force they had either stopped taking women as clients or did so
reluctantly, specifically because women typically do not have the
financial resources necessary to pay the regular legal fees.
7. COURT APPOINTED EXPERTS
Steps should be taken to insure that both parties in a marital
dissolution proceeding have access to the services of expert witnesses.
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IMPLEMENTATION:
It is recommended that the Judicial Council, in consultation with
the state bar, examine the feasibility of providing court-appointed
expert witnesses for a party who cannot afford to hire such
witnesses when the other party in the action has hired expert
.witnesses.
DISCUSSION:
Similar to the attorney's fees issues, the question here is how to
equalize the resources of the divorcing couple in the courtroom
when the two spouses are not equally able to pay for these
resoirces. For example, one spouse may own a business and have
access to the accountant regularly used for that business, while the
other spouse cannot afford to hire another accountant.
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Appendix
(Prepared by Sara McCarthy)
In an article published in Social Forces,' Rand Corporation
researchers Linda Waite, Gus Haggstrom, and David Kanouse
analyzed the expected employment, based on past employment
histories, of a cohort of young married men and women. The
expected employment patterns were compared to actual employment
patterns subsequent to the birth of a first child. It was found that
upon the birth of a first child, the proportion of women employed
dropped dramatically; even two years later, the proportion employed
was 40 percent lower than what would have been predicted in the
absence of childbirth. (See Figure 1 below.)2
As shown in Figure 1, while absent a childbirth approximately 85
percent of the married women would have been expected to be
employed two years later, only approximately 45 percent were
actually employed subsequent to childbirth. The authors surmised
that new mothers can be divided into two groups: the majority who
leave the labor force after the birth of a child and a significant
minority who remain in the labor force (many of whom are
employed full time).3 In Figure 1, it also can be observed that
compared to the effect of parenthood on the careers of mothers,
the impact of parenthood on the careers of fathers is slight.
In addition to reducing the proportion of women in the labor
force, parenthood also results in a decline in the average earnings
of those women who do return to the labor force subsequent to
childbirth. As shown in Figure 2, those married mothers who did
continue to be employed after childbirth experienced a decline in
earnings over the two years subsequent to childbirth. This
conclusion is based on a comparison of the womens' actual earnings
to the earnings they could have expected had they not become
1 Waite, Haggstrom & Kanouse, The Effects of Parenthwod on the Career Orientation and
Job Characteristics of Young Adults, 65 SocIAL FORCES 43-73 (1986). Figure 1 and 2 were
reprinted in the Senate Task Force Report with the permission of the authors.




According to the researchers,
[Figure 2] gives average actual weekly earnings for mothers
compared to average estimated expected earnings if they had not
become parents . . . . Expected and actual earnings tend to
remain the same until just after the first birth, when actual
earnings decline and expected earnings continue to rise slightly.
By the time the child becomes two years old, employed mothers
earn about $35 per week less on average in 1979 dollars than we
estimate they would have earned if they had not had that birth.4
In contrast, father's weekly earnings closely resemble that which
would have been predicted had they not become parents. (See
Figure 2.) Although fathers experience a "slight negative effect..
. [on] occupational status, wages, and earnings in the two years
following the first birth," the impact on the mother's earnings is
much greater.5 The decline in the father's earnings approximated
only one-third of the decline in the mother's earnings (and her
earnings were lower at the outset).
As pointed out by Waite, Haggstrom, and Kanouse, persons
anticipating parenthood may have different career expectations than
those planning to delay parenthood, and this difference in
orientation or career goals may explain in part the lower
employment rates and lower earnings of women who do become
parents. However, whether caused by the birth itself or an
orientation toward parenthood, the important point is that
parenthood is associated with a major decline in the employment
and expected earnings of mothers but not on the employment and
expected earnings of fathers. This differential impact raises
important public policy questions if our courts expect mothers to
support themselves (and their children) after divorce.
4 Id at 63.
5 Id at 22.
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